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INTRODUCTION 
Freedom of speech, the fundamental freedom from a 
fettered tongue and frustrated mind, is a cornerstone of the 
United States Bill of Rights and is extended to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.1  Since its conception, 
this right has expanded to cover many forms of speech 
including student speech.   However, as the Supreme Court 
cautioned in Tinker v. Des Moines, this is not an absolute 
right.2  Today, when student speech broadcasted over the 
Internet emotionally wounds and even plays a role in the 
deaths of other students, the need for regulation is even more 
apparent.3  New York Times columnist Charles Blow wrote on 
October 14, 2011 how being bullied in school led him to decide 
to commit suicide.4  He was eight years old and felt the 
bleakness of the bullied.5  This was before the days of 
cyberbullying.  Back then, “[t]he schoolyard bullies beat you 
up and then [went] home,” notes Parry Aftab, Internet safety 
expert and privacy lawyer.6  Now “cyberbullies beat you up at 
home, at grandma’s house, whereever [sic] you’re connected to 
 
 1. See U.S. CONST. amend. I, XIV. 
 2. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 
(1969). 
 3. See Yunji de Nies et al., Mean Girls: Cyberbullying Blamed for Teen 
Suicides, ABC NEWS (Jan. 28, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/ 
Parenting/girls-teen-suicide-calls-attention-cyberbullying/story?id=9685026 
#.TwOeg9QV1_c. 
 4. Charles M. Blow, Op-Ed., The Bleakness of the Bullied, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
14, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/15/opinion/blow-the-bleakness-of-the-
bullied.html?_r=0. 
 5. See id. 
 6. de Nies, supra note 3. 
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technology.”7  Charles Blow changed his mind, but recent 
examples of suicides connected to cyberbullying show that 
many times these decisions are carried through to the very 
end.  In January 2010, Phoebe Prince, fifteen, killed herself 
as a final response to weeks of cruel bullying inflicted by 
students at her school.8  Phoebe’s little sister found her 
hanging in the stairwell.9  In March 2010, Alexis Pilkington, 
seventeen, took her life due to vicious taunting aimed at her 
from social networking sites.10  There are many more stories 
of teenagers harassed over the Internet and courts are 
struggling with how and whether schools should punish the 
perpetrators. 
This paper will examine the intersection of cyberbullying, 
student speech and ubiquitous computing.  The principal 
legal problem is the circuit split over when and whether to 
use Tinker v. Des Moines.  However, additional problems are 
presented by the ambiguous extent of schools’ jurisdiction 
over speech originating off-campus and the nature of 
ubiquitous computing. 
Part I of this Comment will provide essential background 
information on the issue, define cyberbullying and ubiquitous 
computing, and touch on the iconic Supreme Court quartet 
concerning student speech.11  Part II will identify the legal 
issues at hand.12  It will explore the circuit split and examine 
the various analyses utilized by the Third and Fourth 
Circuits when faced with cyberbullying in public schools.13  
This section will also examine issues related to the increased 
amount of data and access to student speech afforded to 




 7. Id.  
 8. See id. 
 9. Nancy Gibbs, When Bullying Goes Criminal, TIME (Apr. 19, 2010) 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1978773,00.html. 
 10. Cyberbullying Continued After Teen’s Death, CBS NEWS (Mar. 29, 2010, 
12:31 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/03/29/earlyshow/main 
6343077.shtml. 
 11. See infra Part I 
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. See infra Part II. 
 14. See infra Part II. 
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Part III will propose a possible solution to the circuit split 
and address some concerns about ubiquitous computing.15  
The proposed solution consists of (1) a process for establishing 
school jurisdiction over cyber-speech, (2) using a substantial 
disruption standard to determine whether the speech can be 
regulated, and (3) analyzing the effects of excessive data and 
ubiquitous computing on students’ expectations of privacy 
both on-campus and off-campus.16 
I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
The term cyberbullying was first coined by Bill Belsey, 
creator and president of bullying.org, the world’s first website 
devoted to bullying over the Internet.17  His definition is as 
follows: “Cyberbullying involves the use of information and 
communication technologies to support deliberate, repeated, 
and hostile behaviour by an individual or group, that is 
intended to harm others.”18  This activity takes place every 
day in many forms throughout the country and mainly 
impacts young people.19  A step above schoolyard bullying, 
cyberbullying is not restricted to school hallways, 
playgrounds, and classrooms.  It leaks onto students’ 
computer screens and washes through their phones, following 
them with unprecedented accuracy and range. 
Cyberbullying is rapidly increasing due to the rise of 
ubiquitous computing.  “As the third paradigm of computing, 
ubiquitous computing completes the shift of the computer’s 
place and role from its mainframe roots to its embedded 
future.”20  Today, the computer is “embedded throughout the 
 
 15. See infra Part III. 
 16. See infra Part III. 
 17. Bill Belsey: Pioneer Cyberbullying Activist, CYBERBULLYING NEWS (May 
23, 2010), http://www.cyberbullyingnews.com/2010/05/bill-belsey-pioneer-
cyberbullying-activist. 
 18. Cyberbullying Definition, http://www.cyberbullying.org/ (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2013). 
 19. Alison Virginia King, Constitutionality of Cyberbullying Laws: Keeping 
the Online Playground Safe for Both Teens and Free Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 
845, 847 (2010). 
 20. M. Scott Boone, Ubiquitous Computing, Virtual Worlds and the 
Displacement of Property Rights, 4 I/S: J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 91, 93 
(2008).  The author notes that the first paradigm consisted of “the mainframe 
computer filling entire rooms, utilized only by specialists” and the second 
paradigm includes the world of personal computers used by a general populace.  
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physical world” and almost “universal . . . in its 
connectivity.”21  We utilize this connectivity in everyday tasks 
and it is no longer limited to personal computers.22  With 
more students using smart phones, text messages, Facebook 
posts, emails, and other forms of instant thought, remote 
communications are more common, and easily used to bully 
others.23 
Punishing such conduct is difficult because restrictions 
may not unconstitutionally curb student speech, and many 
states do not have specific legislation penalizing 
cyberbullying, so its victims must often resort to semi-related 
tort or criminal laws.24  The topic of student speech is 
especially difficult because the Supreme Court has not ruled 
on the issue.  Consequently, there is a circuit split over which 
framework and precedents to use in analyzing the issue.25  
The split will be discussed at length in Part II of this 
Comment. 
A. The Tinker-Fraser-Kuhlmeier-Morse Quartet 
Supreme Court precedent on student speech can be found 
in the iconic case quartet of Tinker-Fraser-Kuhlmeier-Morse.26  
In Tinker, the Court protected students’ right to wear a black 
armband at school to protest the war in Vietnam and outlined 
a substantial disruption test for student speech.27  The 
majority noted that though a student does not leave his 
constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate, his exercise of 
such rights within the boundaries of the school are limited.28  
 
Id.  We are currently experiencing an overlap between the second paradigm and 
the beginning of the third paradigm.  
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See King, supra note 19, at 850. 
 24. See id. at 849. 
 25. See generally J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 
915 (3d Cir. 2011); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 
2011); Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
 26. See generally Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. 
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 
U.S. 675 (1986); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 
(1969). 
 27. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505, 514. 
 28. See id. at 506–07.  
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The Court decided that “conduct by the student, in class or 
out of it, which for any reason—whether it stems from time, 
place, or type of behavior—materially disrupts classwork or 
involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of 
others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional 
guarantee of freedom of speech.”29 
In Bethel School District v. Fraser, the Court held that 
the First Amendment did not protect lewd speech by a 
student during an assembly.30  The Court recognized a state 
“interest in protecting minors from exposure to vulgar and 
offensive spoken language” because such speech 
“undermine[s] the school’s basic educational mission.”31 
In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the Court 
addressed the issue of school sponsorship of speech32 and 
allowed the school to strike two articles from the student 
newspapers based on their content.33  The Court noted that, 
“educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising 
editorial control over the style and content of student speech 
in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their 
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns.”34  The Court also gave “wide discretion to 
educators to determine reasonable pedagogical concerns, 
ranging from speech that is ‘inadequately researched’ to that 
which is ‘unsuitable for immature audiences.’ ”35  Morse v. 
Frederick, the most recent case, touched on speech outside of 
school grounds and involved a debate about whether a school 
could punish students for speech involving alleged advocacy 
for illegal drug use when that speech took place at an off-
campus rally.36  The Court upheld the punishment of the off-
campus speech because it determined the event to be a school 
sponsored activity.37  These cases form the groundwork for 
understanding the Court’s treatment of student speech.  The 
Internet, however, is changing the very nature of speech, and 
 
 29. Id. at 513. 
 30. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684. 
 31. See id. at 684–85. 
 32. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270–71 (1988). 
 33. See id. at 266. 
 34. Id. at 273. 
 35. See King, supra note 19, at 868 (quoting Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 271)). 
 36. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 401 (2007). 
 37. Id. at 401–02. 
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will require these principles to evolve as well. 
B. Factual Backgrounds of the Cases on CyberBullying: J.S. 
ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District, Layshock ex 
rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School District, and Kowalski v. 
Berkeley County School 
Recent cases on cyberbullying have produced several 
different analyses in the circuit courts.  Since the Supreme 
Court has never considered the issue specifically, the lower 
courts have no choice but to fashion different methods of 
handling the situation, causing splits between and even 
within the circuits.  This Comment will examine three cases, 
J.S., Kowalski, and Layshock, and explore the split between 
the Fourth and Third Circuit as well the as the split within 
each of these circuits.38  J.S. and Layshock were both decided 
on June 13, 2011 by the Third Circuit, but the cases follow 
different frameworks.39  Kowalski, the most recent case, 
decided by the Fourth Circuit on July 27, 2011, tipped the 
balance towards extending the authority of school officials 
when punishing students for off-campus cyberbullying.40 
1. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District 
On March 18, 2007, J.S, an eighth grader, created a fake 
profile for her principal and posted it on MySpace, a social 
networking website.41  She created the profile at home using 
her parents’ computer.42  The profile did not identify Principal 
McGonigle by name or post, but used his official picture from 
the school’s website.43  It was presented as a “self-portrayal of 
a bisexual Alabama middle school principal named ‘M-Hoe’ ” 
and contained “crude content and vulgar language, ranging 
 
 38. See generally J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 
915 (3d Cir. 2011); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 
2011); Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 
2011).  These cases were chosen because they are the most recent examples of 
the legal issues dealt with by circuit courts in attempting to wade through 
cyberbullying and student speech jurisprudence.  While this Comment mostly 
examines the split between the Third and Fourth Circuits, the chosen cases also 
refer to the issues tackled by the Second Circuit in similar circumstances. 
 39. See J.S., 650 F.3d 915; Layshock, 650 F.3d 205. 
 40. Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 572. 
 41. J.S., 650 F.3d at 920. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
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from nonsense and juvenile humor to profanity and shameful 
personal attacks aimed at the principal and his family.”44  J.S. 
listed the principal’s interests as “detention, being a tight ass, 
riding the fraintrain, spending time with my child (who looks 
like a gorilla), baseball, my golden pen, fucking in my office, 
hitting on students and their parents.”45 
This profile was first open to a general viewership but 
J.S. relegated it to a private status after several students 
from the school informed her that they had seen and “thought 
the profile was funny.”46 The Third Circuit commented that 
“[t]hough disturbing, the record indicates that the profile was 
so outrageous that no one took its content seriously. J.S. 
testified that she intended the profile to be a joke between 
herself and her friends."47  Since the school computers blocked 
access to MySpace, no one could access the profile from school 
and Principal McGonigle learned of its existence through a 
student.48  “McGonigle asked this student to bring him a 
printout of the profile to school the next day, which she did. It 
is undisputed that the only printout of the profile that was 
ever brought to school was one brought at McGonigle’s 
specific request.”49 
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the school and J.S. challenged.50  The court of appeals 
reviewed the case de novo on whether the grant of summary 
judgment was appropriate in this case.51  The Third Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s ruling, but hearing the case again 
en banc, vacated its prior decision and reversed the ruling on 
the First Amendment issue in the lower court.52  The court’s 
ruling is as follows: the school district reasonably could not 
have forecast substantial disruption of, or material 
interference with, the school when an eighth grade student 
created, from her home computer, an Internet profile of the 
school principal using photos from the school website, 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id.  
 46. Id. at 921.  
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See id. at 925. 
 51. See id. 
 52. See id. at 920.  
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insinuating that he was a sex addict and pedophile. 
Therefore, the school district violated the student’s First 
Amendment free speech rights when it suspended her for 
creating the profile. This is especially so considering she took 
specific steps to make the profile private so only her friends 
could access it, and the profile itself was so outrageous that 
no one could have taken it seriously, and no one did.53 
2. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School 
District 
Justin Layshock, a seventeen-year-old senior at a high 
school in Pennsylvania, also used MySpace to create a parody 
profile of his high school principal.54  He created this profile 
sometime in December 2005, using a personal computer at his 
grandmother’s house.55  “The only school resource that was 
even arguably involved in creating the profile was a 
photograph of Trosch [the principal] that Justin copied from 
the School District’s website.”56  Layshock restricted access to 
the profile, allowing only designated friends to view the 
material.57  “Not surprisingly, word of the profile ‘spread like 
wildfire’ and soon reached most, if not all, of . . . [the] student 
body.”58  The administration became aware of the profile 
when a teacher spotted the profile on a student’s computer 
screen and had to discipline several students for congregating 
around it and giggling.59  The theme of Layshock’s parody 
profile was ‘big’ because the principal “is apparently a large 
man.”60  The following is a sample of the profile: 
Birthday: too drunk to remember 
Are you a health freak: big steroid freak 
In the past month have you smoked: big blunt 
In the past month have you been on pills: big pills.61 
After viewing this profile, several other students created 
 
 53. Id. at 928–31. 
 54. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 207–08 
(3d Cir. 2011). 
 55. Id. at 207. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 208. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See id. at 209. 
 60. Id. at 208. 
 61. See id. (footnote omitted). 
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parody profiles for the same principal and “[e]ach of those 
profiles was more vulgar and more offensive than Justin’s.”62 
Layshock used the school’s computers to access the 
profile and show it to other students.63  As a result of his 
profile and the derivate profiles of other students, the school 
had to suspend computer classes and monitor students’ use of 
their personal computers.64  Principal Trosch believed the 
profiles to be “degrading, demeaning, demoralizing, and 
shocking. He was also concerned about his reputation and 
complained to the local police.”65 
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Layshock, and the Third Circuit affirmed the decision.66  
Sitting en banc, the Third Circuit later vacated its prior 
ruling, and once again affirmed the district court decision's 
finding in favor of Layshock.67  The court ruled that though 
Layshock had used school computers to access the profile, this 
did not “forge a nexus between the School and Justin’s 
profile.”68  There was no evidence that Layshock engaged in 
lewd or profane speech while in school, and his speech did not 
result in any substantial disruption of school.69 
3. Kowalski v. Berkeley County School 
Unlike the preceding cases, the cyberbullying in this case 
was targeted towards a fellow high school student, not a 
school official.70  Kara Kowalski, a twelfth grade student at 
Musselman High School in the Berkeley County School 
District created a MySpace page titled Students Against Sluts 
Herpes (S.A.S.H).71  “Kowalski claimed in her deposition that 
‘S.A.S.H.’ was an acronym for ‘Students Against Sluts 
Herpes,’ but a classmate, Ray Parsons, stated that it was an 
acronym for “Students Against Shay’s Herpes,” referring to 
another Musselman High School Student,  
 
 62. Id. 
 63. See id. at 209. 
 64. See id.  
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. at 211. 
 67. See id. at 216. 
 68. Id. at 214–15. 
 69. See id. at 216. 
 70. Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 71. Id. at 567. 
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Shay N. . . . .”72 
Ray Parsons was the first one to join the group.73  He 
uploaded a “photograph of himself and a friend holding their 
noses while displaying a sign that read, ‘Shay Has Herpes,’ 
referring to Shay N.”74  Kowalski promptly posted a positive 
response, stating “Ray you are soo funny!=),” after which 
Parsons added two more photographs of Shay N.75  “In the 
first, he had drawn red dots on Shay N.’s face to simulate 
herpes and added a sign near her pelvic region, that read, 
‘Warning: Enter at your own risk.’ ”76  In the second 
photograph, he captioned Shay N.’s face with a sign that read, 
“portrait of a whore.”77  The commentary posted on this 
webpage mostly targeted Shay N. and was authored by 
Musselman High School students.78  Two posts singled 
Kowalski out as the creator of the page and credited her with 
“mastermind[ing] a group that hates [someone].”79  After 
discovering the webpage, Shay N.’s parents complained to the 
school.80  Shay N. refused to attend her classes, feeling 
targeted and harassed.81  Kowalski claimed that she was 
unable to take down the webpage and renamed it “Students 
Against Angry People” in response to the harassment charges 
filed against her.82  The school district disciplined her for 
these actions and Kowalski began this action by filing suit 
and contending that the school district had violated her rights 
to free speech and due process.83  The district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the school district holding that 
it was authorized to discipline Kowalski for her webpage.84  
Reviewing the case de novo, the Fourth Circuit upheld the 
judgment of the district court.85 
 
 72. Id.  
 73. Id. at 568. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 570. 
 84. Id. at 567, 570. 
 85. Id. at 567. 
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II. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM 
The Supreme Court has never issued a decision 
concerning cyberbullying.86  This leaves the circuit courts to 
their own devices in fashioning rules, limits, and guidelines 
for school districts.  Though there is a set framework on 
regulating student speech within the schools, or student 
speech that contains the imprimatur of the school, it does not 
always cover situations created by the rise of ubiquitous 
computing.87  Currently, there is a split among the circuits, 
and even within the Third Circuit, over how and when to use 
Tinker to regulate off-campus student bullying.88 
The fragmented nature of the jurisprudence leaves school 
districts unsure of their jurisdiction over student actions, and 
more importantly, it leaves the victims of cyberbullying 
without guidance or assurance of a remedy.  The fact that 
most states and cities do not have specific cyberbullying 
ordinances also makes it difficult for victims to seek 
retribution through the legal system.89 
III. ANALYSIS 
The rifts in the opinions analyzed here run along four 
main lines: (1) whether Tinker should be used for off-campus 
speech,90 (2) if using Tinker, should a court look for a 
reasonable forecast of substantial disruption or for an actual 
substantial disruption,91 (3) how the “everywhere at once” 
nature of ubiquitous computing affects student speech,92 and 
(4) whether cyberbullying cases merit a departure from the 
 
 86. See id. at 571. 
 87. King, supra note 19, at 870.  The Tinker-Fraser-Kuhlmeier-Morse 
quartet is useful for providing guidelines of student speech when it is political, 
lewd, or sponsored by the school in some way.  However, these cases do not 
address the multitude of issues created by ubiquitous computing and 
cyberbullying and may in fact serve to stunt the growth of legal discourse in this 
area if they are applied without more thought to the current context and 
technology. 
 88. See supra Part I.B.  
 89. See id. at 849, 857. 
 90. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 936 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (Smith, J., concurring). 
 91. See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 571; Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage 
Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 217 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 92. J.S., 650 F.3d at 940 (Smith, J., concurring). 
JOSHI FINAL 7/23/2013  9:26 PM 
2013] SHARING THE DIGITAL SANDBOX 641 
 
Tinker-Fraser-Kuhlmeier-Morse framework.93 
A. Whether Tinker Should be Used for Off-Campus Speech 
In Tinker, the Supreme Court ruled that student speech 
is protected unless it causes a substantial disruption.94  The 
case specifically referred to student speech that took place on-
campus, but the framework can apply to cyberbullying that 
involves off-campus speech.  However, as the opinions 
discussed below explain, the Tinker holding cannot be used as 
is.  It should be modified to accommodate the evolution of 
speech. 
J.S. helps illustrate the reasoning behind choosing a 
Tinker approach.  In this case, the district court did not follow 
Tinker.95  Instead, the court focused on the content of the 
online profile, which it found to be lewd and sexually 
explicit.96  On appeal, however, the Third Circuit chose to 
apply the Tinker test, holding that adopting another standard 
would allow schools “to punish any speech by a student that 
takes place anywhere, at any time, as long as it is about the 
school or a school official, is brought to the attention of a 
school official, and is deemed ‘offensive’ by the prevailing 
authority.”97  The court also cautioned that “[u]nder this 
standard, two students can be punished for using a vulgar 
remark to speak about their teacher at a private party, if 
another student overhears the remark, reports it to the school 
authorities, and the school authorities find the remark 
‘offensive.’ ”98  Tinker better captures the effect of 
cyberbullying, with its focus on the victim as opposed to other 
cases approached where the focus is on the individual student 
engaged in the speech. 
Instead of creating a new standard for cyberbullying, the 
Third Circuit decided that since the Supreme Court had 
“analyzed the extent to which school officials can regulate 
student speech in several thorough opinions,”99 it would use 
 
 93. See Layshock, 650 F.3d at 216. 
 94. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 
(1969). 
 95. J.S., 650 F.3d at 923. 
 96. See id. 
 97. Id. at 933. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 925. 
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established precedent.100  While the decision to use this iconic 
case was appropriate, the majority opinion should have taken 
the unique nature of the off-campus speech into consideration 
and not used Tinker as a prêt-à-porter case. 
The decision to apply Tinker, however, was not 
unanimous.  The en banc Third Circuit did not come to an 
even consensus and presented a splintered document with a 
lengthy concurrence and a strong dissent.101  The concurrence, 
authored by Judge Smith and joined by Chief Judge McKee 
and Judges Sloviter, Fuentes, and Hardiman, varies on what 
the key issues should be, but reaches the same conclusion as 
the majority.102  Judge Smith states: 
I write separately to address a question that the majority 
opinion expressly leaves open: whether Tinker applies to 
off-campus speech in the first place. I would hold that it 
does not, and that the First Amendment protects students 
engaging in off-campus speech to the same extent it 
protects speech by citizens in the community at large.103 
The dissent authored by Judge Fisher and joined by 
Judges Scirica, Rendell, Barry, Jordan, and Vanaskie,104 
embarks down a third path.  It holds that while the 
application of the Tinker test to off-campus speech may be 
appropriate, the court did not apply the substantial 
disturbance test correctly to the facts.105  The dissent 
highlights the fact that the speech here was lewd and vulgar, 
not political in nature like in Tinker.106  Consistent with the 
rest of the opinion, the dissent is also at war with itself.107  
After applying the facts of this case to Tinker’s rule and 
holding in favor of the school, Judge Fisher exhibits a 
discomfort with using Tinker for off-campus speech.  He 
writes that “[i]n Tinker, the Court stated that ‘conduct by the 
student, in class or out of it, which . . . materially disrupts 
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of 
rights of others is, of course, not immunized by constitutional 
 
 100. See id. at 933.  
 101. Id. at 936–52. 
 102. Id. at 936 (Smith, J., concurring). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 941 (Fisher, J., dissenting). 
 105. See id.  
 106. See id. at 943. 
 107. Id. at 941–52. 
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guarantee of freedom of speech.’ ”108  He finds the language 
unclear and asks whether Tinker “means to distinguish the 
classroom from the world beyond the schoolhouse gates, or if 
it simply means out of class but in the cafeteria, schoolyard, 
or other areas on school grounds.”109  It is obvious here that 
the judges agree that Tinker is important but are unclear on 
how to use the case.  The application of Tinker either needs to 
be modified so as to fit the nature of cyberspeech or the 
Tinker rule used must be supplemented by another theory 
that better accommodates the fluidity of boundaries created 
by the ubiquitous use of the Internet. 
The Third Circuit also examined whether the Tinker test 
applied to off-campus speech in Layshock.  Though the cases 
were decided on the same day, the Layshock decision takes an 
entirely different route.110  The majority opinion in Layshock 
avoided Tinker altogether and chose to follow precedent set 
by the Second Circuit, asking whether there was a sufficient 
nexus between Layshock’s speech and the school.111  The 
strongly worded J.S. dissent chose to apply a new case, 
Doninger v. Niehoff, which would increase the school district’s 
authority over off-campus speech.112  In Doninger, the Second 
Circuit faced a situation where a high school student used a 
blog to encourage other students and members of the 
community to contact the school and complain about an 
allegedly cancelled concert.113  Layshock points out that in 
this case, the Second Circuit upheld the student’s punishment 
because it “‘ created a foreseeable risk of substantial 
disruption to the work and discipline of the school.’ ”114  
Despite the efforts of the Third Circuit, ignoring a landmark 
case like Tinker actually weakens the opinion and takes it 
farther away from existing jurisprudence. 
 
 
 108. See id. at 942 (Fisher, J., dissenting) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines 
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 220 (3d 
Cir. 2011). 
 111. Id. at 214. 
 112. J.S., 650 F.3d at 915 (citing Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 
2008)). 
 113. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 44–45.   
 114. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 218 (quoting Doninger, 527 F.3d at 53). 
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The Fourth Circuit in Kowalski chose to use Tinker to 
regulate off-campus student speech.  Instead of assuming the 
case applied to the facts at issue like the Third Circuit did in 
J.S., the majority opinion states “the language of Tinker 
supports the conclusion that public schools have a ‘compelling 
interest’ in regulating speech that interferes with or disrupts 
the work and discipline of the school, including discipline for 
student harassment and bullying.”115  The opinion then 
articulates that “student-on-student bullying is a ‘major 
concern’ in schools across the country and can cause victims 
to become depressed and anxious, to be afraid to go to school, 
and to have thoughts of suicide.”116  Therefore, just “as schools 
have a responsibility to provide a safe environment for 
students free from messages advocating illegal drug use, 
schools have a duty to protect their students from harassment 
and bullying in the school environment.”117  It is important to 
note here that the court carefully specifies that halting 
“student-on-student” bullying is a compelling interest but did 
not widen its holding to other situations.  In J.S. and 
Layshock, the bullying victims were adults and authority 
figures in the schools, possessing considerably greater power 
than the student victim in Kowalski.  Here, in Kowalski, the 
strong application of Tinker, and expansion of the school’s 
jurisdiction to off-campus speech was likely prompted by a 
concern for minors.  The Third Circuit may have been less 
inclined to apply this brand of forceful reasoning because of 
the age of the victims in both J.S. and Layshock. 
Based on the divisive split amongst courts, it is clear that 
the identity of the victim is extremely important to the 
evolution of caselaw.  For example, two out of the three cases 
analyzed in this Comment have adult victims.  Not only were 
they adults, but, as administrators or staff members of the 
schools, they possessed considerably greater power and 
influence over their bullies.  As adults, they were also more 
likely to report and remedy the bullying incidents.  Children 
are less likely to come forward as victims, less likely to seek 
legal recourse and therefore contribute less to the evolution of 
legal theory.  Lack of litigation where minors are victims of 
 
 115. Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 572 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 116. Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 572. 
 117. Id. (citation omitted). 
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cyberbullying may be the reason why courts are not applying 
Tinker in a way that would increase schools’ jurisdiction over 
actions committed off-campus. 
B. When Applying Tinker, Should Courts Require a 
Reasonable Forecast of Substantial Disruption or an Actual 
Disruption? 
The Third Circuit specified in the majority opinion of J.S. 
that there must be a reasonable forecast of a substantial 
disruption at school in order to justify a restriction on student 
speech.118  It further held that “[i]f Tinker’s black armbands—
an ostentatious reminder of the highly emotional and 
controversial subject of the Vietnam war—could not 
‘reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial 
disruption of or material interference with school activities,’ 
neither can J.S.’s profile, despite the unfortunate humiliation 
it caused for [Principal] McGonigle.”119 
The concurring opinion took a different approach.  
Though it did not advocate applying Tinker, Judge Smith 
takes the time to declare that in the event a court were to 
choose to apply Tinker, it should not utilize the foreseeable 
standard, but rather look to whether there the speech caused 
an actual disruption.120 He posits: 
I would have no difficulty applying Tinker to a case where 
a student sent a disruptive email to school faculty from his 
home computer.  Regardless of its place of origin, speech 
intentionally directed towards a school is properly 
considered on-campus speech.  On the other hand, speech 
originating off campus does not mutate into on-campus 
speech simply because it foreseeably makes its way onto 
campus.121 
He insists that a “bare foreseeability standard could be 
stretched too far, and would risk ensnaring any off-campus 
expression that happened to discuss school-related 
matters.”122 
 
 118. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 930 (3d 
Cir. 2011). 
 119. Id. at 929–30 (citation omitted) (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514). 
 120. See id. at 940 (Smith, J., concurring). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
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Interestingly, the dissenting opinion finds more common 
ground on this matter with the majority than does the 
concurrence.123  The dissent condones using a foreseeability 
standard, but applies the facts of the J.S. case to the rule 
differently and ultimately comes out in favor of the school 
district.124  In doing so, it aligns itself with the Second Circuit 
and its opinion in Doninger.125  The dissent is more concerned 
with the school as an institution than the majority.  To the 
dissent, the effects on the community and on the concept of 
public education are at the heart of the issue.  This outlook 
focuses on the very foundation of the relationship between 
students and their teachers.  Judge Fisher is concerned with 
students “making false accusations” and worries about 
leaving a school “powerless” against student speech.126  
Interestingly, the judges see the adult as one who is helpless 
and without the power to defend the institution.  The dissent 
wants to protect public schools and therefore aligns with the 
school district and the Second Circuit. 
Though the Third Circuit only requires that student 
speech have a reasonable forecast of causing disruption,127 the 
Fourth Circuit in Kowalski advocated requiring an actual 
disruption of the school environment in order for the school to 
step in and regulate student speech.  The majority opinion 
states, “[a]t bottom, we conclude that the school was 
authorized to discipline Kowalski because her speech 
interfered with the work and discipline of the school.”128  The 
court states in unequivocal terms that “Kowalski’s speech 
caused the interference and disruption described in 
Tinker.”129  It added that because the purpose of the speech 
was to target a student with vicious remarks and accusations, 
 
 123. See id. at 941 (Fisher, J., dissenting). 
 124. Id. 
 125. See id. at 950–51.  
 126. See id. at 941 (Smith, J., concurring). 
 127. See id. (citing Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 
F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979)).  In Thomas, a group of high school students was 
suspended for producing a satirical publication targeted at the school 
community.  See 607 F.2d 1043.  They were careful to distribute the material 
away from school and did most of the work away from school.  Id. at 1045.  The 
Second Circuit determined that the publication was not sufficiently related to 
the school to justify its exercise of authority over it.  See id. at 1050–53. 
 128. Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 574 (4th Cir. 2011).  
 129. Id. at 572. 
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the educational system was not required to tolerate it.130  The 
deep disruption of a student’s psyche was akin to the 
disruption mentioned in Tinker.131  The Fourth Circuit was 
likely trying to separate itself from the inconclusive Third 
Circuit and set forth a strong precedent to protect future 
student victims of cyberbullying. 
Strong opinions in the Third and Fourth Circuits seem to 
be choosing to apply Tinker and supporting the idea of a 
school environment safe from bullies.  However, without a 
clear Tinker test, or even a more substantial choice to apply 
Tinker at all, lower courts around the country are seriously 
lacking in guidance on cyberbullying. 
C. The “Everywhere at Once” Nature of Ubiquitous 
Computing and Student Speech 
A notable section of the court’s concurrence in the J.S. 
opinion expressly addresses the tricky web woven by 
ubiquitous computing around student speech.132  Judge Smith 
asks “how can one tell whether speech takes place on or off 
campus?”133  He then admits that “[t]he answer plainly cannot 
turn solely on where the speaker was sitting when the speech 
was originally uttered . . . [because this would] fail to 
accommodate the somewhat ‘everywhere at once’ nature of 
the internet.”134  The Layshock concurrence also sees the on-
campus and off-campus distinction mentioned in its majority 
opinion, and in the majority opinion of J.S., as largely 
obsolete.  Judge Jordan writes that a student could use the 
tools of modern technology to “engineer egregiously disruptive 
events . . . while standing one foot outside school property, 
[and] the school administrators might succeed in heading off 
the actual disruption in the building but would be left 
powerless to discipline the student.”135  He sees this as 
problematic, finding it difficult “to see how words that may 
cause pandemonium in a public school would be protected by 
 
 130. See id. at 573. 
 131. See id. at 572. 
 132. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 940 
(3d Cir. 2011). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 221 (3d 
Cir. 2011). 
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the First Amendment simply because technology now allows 
the timing and distribution . . . to be controlled by someone 
beyond the campus boundary.”136  These words go to the heart 
of the technology issue.  Ubiquitous computing “undoubtedly 
create[s] a plethora of legal issues, both by challenging the 
ability of existing legal rules to cope with radically new 
circumstances and by creating situations so new as to be 
seemingly ungoverned by existing legal rules.”137 
While the Layshock and J.S. opinions address the 
slippery nature of new technology, the Kowalski opinion is 
resolute in its silence on the matter.138  This causes another 
split between the circuits.  Reading the facts of the cases, 
“legal issues presented by the advent of ubiquitous computing 
are readily apparent . . . [and stem from] the potential loss of 
privacy in continuously monitored environments that 
constantly acquire, store and transmit information about 
individuals in those environments.”139 
When J.S. and Layshock created their parody profiles, 
both students designated the pages as private and only 
opened the discussions to other students.140  Their materials, 
however, travelled beyond their designated boundaries and 
ultimately reached their school principals.141  Without 
ubiquitous computing, the school would have no way to 
gather this data apart from using students to report each 
other.  Before smart phones and social networking, this would 
have been an incident of passing notes between students.  
The teacher, assuming he noticed it, would most likely 
confiscate the note.  Here, we have inter-student 
communication, which is also simultaneously being 
broadcasted worldwide, increasing the potential for the 
schools, and therefore the government, to capture this 
information.  “Just as previous communication technologies 
 . . . provided opportunities for the government to acquire 
information while it was in transit, ubiquitous computing 
technologies, particularly those aspects of ubiquitous 
 
 136. Id. at 222. 
 137. Boone, supra note 20, at 93. 
 138. See J.S., 650 F.3d at 940 (Smith, J., concurring); Kowalski v. Berkeley 
Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011); Layshock, 650 F.3d at 216. 
 139. Boone, supra note 20, at 94. 
 140. J.S., 650 F.3d at 921; Layshock, 650 F.3d at 208. 
 141. J.S., 650 F.3d at 921; Layshock, 650 F.3d at 208. 
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computing involved in sensing, storing, and transmitting 
data, create new opportunities for the government to 
intercept information.”142 
This is apparent in how the schools in all three cases 
discovered the bullying material.143  Students using the 
interconnectivity and malleable nature of the Internet may 
not always perceive the ease with which it may be 
broadcasted to a much wider audience than originally 
intended.  This “inherent interconnectivity of ubiquitous 
computing makes it so that the captured information may 
often be in the hands of one or more third parties.  The 
government, in turn, may acquire the collected information 
from those third parties . . . .”144  Consequently, schools can 
monitor more speech now, and as a result, may seek to 
exercise jurisdiction over more realms of student life because 
such speech makes its way into the schoolhouse. 
Scott Boone, Associate Professor of Law at Appalachian 
Law and author, provides an example of how an entity could 
monitor and control remote behavior solely through collecting 
data previously unavailable to it.145  In his article on legal 
issues presented by ubiquitous computing, he writes that 
recently, certain Californians who rented cars discovered 
upon return that their bill amounted to thousands of dollars 
instead of the expected hundreds.146  “It turned out, 
unbeknownst to them, that GPS in the rentals had monitored 
the vehicle crossing into another state and that the fine print 
in the rental contract provided for relatively high additional 
charges if the rental was taken out of California.”147  The 
information was collected and conveyed by devices connected 
to the web.  These devices were capable of broadcasting 
information previously thought unavailable to car rental 
companies.148  This is very similar to cases of cyberbullying 
where access and capture of certain information may lead to 
fines and punishments.  Students and schools are not 
 
 142. Boone, supra note 20, at 123. 
 143. See J.S., 650 F.3d at 921; Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 568; Layshock, 650 F.3d 
at 209–10. 
 144. Boone, supra note 20, at 123. 
 145. See id. at 91, 144–45. 
 146. See id. 
 147. Id. at 145. 
 148. See id. at 144. 
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contracting parties, and therefore, there is no immediate 
result dictated by the increased monitoring.  It is clear from 
reading recent case law, however, that this facet of 
communication technology needs regulations and rulings so 
schools can continue to protect student speech while also 
punishing and proscribing cyberbullying. 
D. Whether Cyberbullying Cases Merit a Departure from the 
Tinker-Fraser-Kuhlmeier-Morse Framework 
The Third Circuit decided Layshock and J.S. on the same 
day and, in attempting to forge some sort of unity, applied 
markedly different standards to the same set of facts.149  As 
laid out in Part I, the facts of the two cases are almost 
identical.  It stands to reason then, that the same judges 
would apply the same reasoning.  The fact that they did no 
such thing serves to highlight the legal issues and rifts 
caused by cyberbullying.  After providing a background on the 
Tinker-Fraser-Kuhlmeier-Morse quartet, the majority opinion 
in Layshock makes use of Thomas v. Board of Education, a 
Second Circuit case from 1979 dealing with the issue of 
satirical student speech.150 
In Thomas, several students produced a satirical 
publication directed at the school.151  The periodical was 
created off-campus, never sold at school, and the principal 
only discovered it by confiscating it from a student who 
brought it on campus.152  The Second Circuit focused on the 
fact that the activity only had a de minimis connection with 
the school and was therefore out of the school’s jurisdiction.153  
The Third Circuit applied this analysis to Justin Layshock’s 
situation and held that “the relationship between Justin’s 
conduct and the school [was] far more attenuated than in 
Thomas.”154  The opinion added that “the First Amendment 
[could not] tolerate the School District stretching its authority 
into Justin’s grandmother’s home and reaching Justin . . . in 
 
 149. See Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 
215 (3d Cir. 2011); J.S., 650 F.3d at 926. 
 150. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 215 (citing Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville 
Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979)). 
 151. See Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1045. 
 152. See id.  
 153. See id. at 1050. 
 154. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 216. 
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order to punish him for the expressive conduct that he 
engaged in there.”155 
Like the dissent in J.S., the Layshock majority opinion 
cites Doninger but discredits it based on the facts.156  
Doninger, a more recent case than Thomas, involves the same 
technology issues and is about off-campus student speech.157  
Interestingly, the court uses a much older case that does not 
address technology concerns to uphold its reasoning.158  
Reading the Layshock concurring opinion, it becomes evident 
that the majority used Thomas in order to avoid using Tinker, 
which would be sure to produce another splintered opinion.159 
The concurring opinion in J.S. also offers an alternative 
to the traditional student speech framework.  Judge Smith, in 
choosing not to apply Tinker, advocated using the First 
Amendment to analyze cyberbullying speech that takes place 
off-campus.160  His standards are also less student-specific 
because he believes that “the First Amendment protects 
students engaging in off-campus speech to the same extent it 
protects speech by citizens in the community at large.”161  The 
concurring opinion chooses to discard Tinker and the rest of 
the framework because it believes the cases should be 
grounded in the special characteristics of the school 
environment.162  The speech in J.S. was not created or 
transmitted in this environment and, therefore, the opinion 
reasons, a standard First Amendment analysis should apply 
to this sort of cyberbullying.163 
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
Cyberbullying in public schools can be regulated in a 
variety of ways including school policies, legislation, and 
court decisions.  The path to regulation is currently unpaved 
and foggy without a clear decision from courts.  School 
 
 155. Id. 
 156. See id. at 217. 
 157. See Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 158. See Layshock, 650 F.3d at 215. 
 159. See id. at 220 (Jordan, J., concurring). 
 160. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 936 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (Smith, J., concurring). 
 161. Id.  
 162. See id. at 937. 
 163. See id. 
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districts are unclear about what they can regulate and how 
far they can go to prevent or punish bullying.  “[S]chools 
represent a critical battleground for cyberbullying 
prevention” but “without direction on when and how they 
may legally punish student Internet expression, [they] are 
left paralyzed in the face of uncertainty.”164 
A. Deciding on Tinker 
With the split between and within the nation’s circuit 
courts on the use of Tinker, schools and pupils have no way of 
knowing which speech is protected and which is not.  The 
questions to be solved by the courts are as follows: (1) should 
Tinker be applied to off-campus cyberbullying speech?, (2) if 
so, which standard should apply?, and (3) do the special 
characteristics of ubiquitous computing require additional 
privacy and due process analysis when student speech is 
involved? 
B. Courts Should Use Tinker if a School Can Show it Has 
Jurisdiction Over the Speech in Question 
1. Obtaining Jurisdiction—Adapting the Minimum 
Contacts Framework to Cyberspeech 
All three cases discussed above spent a considerable 
amount of time and ink discussing the boundary of the 
schoolhouse and the location of the schoolhouse gate in order 
to determine whether the speaker was on-campus or off-
campus.  “With respect to speech, courts have recognized the 
unique characteristics of the school environment and have 
given schools the authority to suppress speech inside the 
school that would not be regulated outside of the school 
setting.”165  However, as the concurrence in J.S. states, the 
fluid nature of the Internet, combined with the expansive 
reach of “smart” devices, makes it difficult to determine which 
speech was strictly on-campus and which occurred off-
grounds.166  Therefore, eradicating this increasingly fictional 
 
 164. King, supra note 19, at 874–75. 
 165. Renee L. Servance, Cyberbullying, Cyber-Harassment, and the Conflict 
Between Schools and the First Amendment, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 1213, 1233 
(2003).  
 166. See J.S., 650 F.3d at 940 (Smith, J., concurring). 
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boundary may serve a greater purpose in cyberbullying 
jurisprudence than attempting to define it.  The jurisdiction 
of schools is greatest when students are in class and in the 
school environment and decreases as the students move 
further away.  That being said, a student with an iPhone 
linked with, for example, a Facebook application, could 
effectively be engaging in on-campus speech as he contacts 
other students, teachers and effects change in the school 
environment.  Similarly, the same student could be speaking 
off-campus while wandering the school hallways. 
The problem of school jurisdiction here is comparable to 
the question of when a particular state has jurisdiction over 
an individual.  Much as the Third Circuit did in Layshock and 
J.S., the early Supreme Court imagined jurisdiction based on 
a strictly geographical model.  In the 1877 case of Pennoyer v. 
Neff, the Court stated that, “[t]he authority of every tribunal 
is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State 
in which it is established.”167  The Court established that the 
defendant must be present within a state for it to exercise 
jurisdiction over him.168  However, as the country matured 
and adopted new transportation technologies, its citizens 
became increasingly more motile and geographical 
boundaries became archaic determinations of jurisdiction.  
Student speech through ubiquitous computing is the 
equivalent of the transcontinental railroad, the system of 
interstate highways and the invention of the airplane all 
rolled into one sleek, portable device.  One cannot expect 
results with analysis reminiscent of Pennoyer and the 
nineteenth century.  On-campus and off-campus locations 
should not be used to determine whether schools may reach 
student speech, just as a defendant’s location is no longer the 
sole determinant of whether a state can reach him. 
Overturning the rigid geographical analysis of Pennoyer, 
the Court stated in International Shoe that a state may have 
jurisdiction over a defendant if said defendant has certain 
minimum contacts within the state, and the if the suit does 
not offend the traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.169  In sanctioning the State of Washington’s 
 
 167. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877). 
 168. See id. 
 169. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
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jurisdiction over a commercial entity based in Delaware, the 
Court declared that if a company carries on systematic and 
continuous activities within a state, has agents in the forum, 
is putting products into the stream of commerce, and is 
benefitting from the state, it is considered “present” in that 
state.170  The Court heightened this standard in World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, declaring that minimum 
contacts meant the defendant had to purposefully avail 
himself of the state.171  The activity in question had to be 
directed at the state with a set purpose in mind.172  
Additionally, the Court defined traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice to include: (1) evidence of minimum 
contacts, (2) foreseeability of injury, and (3) a showing of the 
state’s interests.173  Directly addressing the Internet, the 
Court declared in Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, that a 
website would be considered “present” in a certain 
jurisdiction based on “the level of interactivity and 
commercial nature of the exchange of information.”174  A blog 
that simply and freely posts information for an open and 
undifferentiated audience is too passive to be present or to be 
purposefully availing itself of any particular population of a 
certain state of jurisdiction.175 
These cases serve as a great frame of reference for courts 
dealing with cyberbullying and student speech issues.  This 
jurisdictional analysis provides a clear answer to the question 
of whether school districts can reach certain speech.  Courts 
should use this analysis to determine whether speech is 
“present” at school and then move on to use Tinker.  In 
Thomas and Layshock, the Second and Third Circuits came 
close to this type of reasoning but did not articulate an 
applicable standard.176  Both cases looked at the nexus of the 
speech with the school, which is very similar to what the 
Supreme Court was looking for in its minimum contacts 
 
 170. See id. at 320. 
 171. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). 
 172. See id. 
 173. See id. at 291–92, 297. 
 174. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. 
Pa. 1997). 
 175. See id. at 1126. 
 176. See, e.g., Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 
205, 215 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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inquiry.177  For student speech, courts should examine 
whether the speech, regardless of where it is composed, has 
minimum contacts with the school, whether it is targeted 
specifically at the school’s agents, whether the proscription of 
the speech would be within the traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice and whether the cyber-content was 
presented in a passive or active manner.  In keeping with 
precedent and policy, “school authority over off-campus 
speech is narrower because outside of the school environment, 
the freedom of speech is at its ‘zenith.’ ”178  “Therefore, courts 
impose a heavy burden on schools to show sufficient 
disruption to regulate off-campus speech.”179  In adapting 
these jurisdictional tests, courts should maintain the heavy 
burden for showing a substantial disruption caused by 
cyberbullying. 
Using this analysis, the school in question would have 
jurisdiction over the speech if it could show that the speech in 
question had minimum contacts within the school.  If the 
speech made systematic and continuous appearances on 
campus, was spread by students or other agents of the school, 
and is about any such agent, the speech will be considered 
within the school’s jurisdiction.  Adding the standard in 
World-Wide Volkswagen, a court would also ask whether the 
student purposefully availed himself of the school.  This 
would include using school images, sharing speech 
specifically with the students of that that high school, or 
using the students to disseminate the speech. 
To determine whether the extension of jurisdiction would 
be within the traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice, the court would look for the aforementioned minimum 
contacts, determine whether there is a foreseeability of injury 
stemming from the speech (this is similar to the Tinker 
standard already used by the Third Circuit), and the school 
would show that it had sufficient interest in extending its 
jurisdiction over the speech.  In J.S., the court cited a former 
decision that required a compelling interest from the school in 
 
 177. See, e.g., id. at 215–16. 
 178. Servance, supra note 165, at 1234 (quoting Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 
Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050 (2d Cir. 1979)). 
 179. Id. 
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order to sanction a proscription of speech.180  In Layshock, the 
court observed that the school had a compelling interest in 
providing students with a drug free environment.181  In 
Kowalski, the court used this same reasoning to suggest that 
the school had just as strong of an interest in providing 
students with a school environment free from bullying and 
harassment.182  In addition, policy concerns for the welfare 
and development of minors would sway courts in favor of 
accepting a sufficient school interest in providing a safe and 
healthy environment for students. 
The new standard for school jurisdiction could be as 
follows: (1) does the speech in question have minimum 
contacts with the school?, (2) can the school reasonably 
forecast a substantial disruption of its environment as a 
result of the speech?, and (3) does the school have a sufficient 
interest in curbing the speech?  Additionally, the courts could 
also consider the ruling in Zippo, where the Court examined 
the level of interactivity and passiveness of the website being 
examined.183  Once the school proves that the speech passes 
the criteria of minimum contacts and appears on an 
interactive and active website, the school will have 
jurisdiction to regulate the speech.  However, it is most 
important to remember that just because a school has 
jurisdiction, it does not automatically have the ability to 
proscribe and punish speech. 
C. Courts Should Use the Substantial Disruption Standard 
in Tinker 
In the cases examined above, the courts seemed to 
assume that the school had jurisdiction over the speech in 
question.  The current circuit split is over how and whether 
Tinker should apply—essentially, what type of cyberbullying 
speech the schools may punish.  In order for the 
jurisprudence on this issue to be consistent, the split between 
 
 180. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 933 
(3d Cir. 2011) (citing Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 305 (3d Cir. 2000)). 
 181. See Layshock, 650 F.3d at 214 (citing Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 
407 (2007)). 
 182. See Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 572 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 183. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1126 
(W.D. Pa. 1997). 
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and within the circuits must be mended.  Courts should 
follow the reasoning in Kowalski and examine whether the 
speech actually caused a substantial disruption.184  However, 
instead of keeping the reasoning identical to that case, courts 
should bring the Tinker reasoning into the Internet age. 
Using a multifactor analysis involving student 
recklessness would tailor Tinker’s requirement of substantial 
disruption to a cyberbullying context.  For example, “the 
school district may not constitutionally punish the student’s 
speech unless the student intentionally or recklessly caused 
the speech to be distributed on campus.”185  In this manner, 
even if the speech were created away from the school using 
student resources, the courts would examine the student’s 
action in creating and distributing the speech in order to 
determine whether it was harmful to the school environment. 
“Intentional distribution of speech occurs when the 
student . . . knows to a substantial certainty that the 
student’s actions will cause the speech to be distributed inside 
the schoolhouse gates.”186  Furthermore, “[r]eckless 
distribution of speech occurs if the student, conscious of the 
risk that the Internet speech will be distributed on-campus, 
chooses to produce the Internet speech.”187  If the student has 
intentionally or recklessly caused cyberbullying speech to 
make a substantial disruption in the school, then a court may 
use the precedent in Tinker to punish such speech. 
This is not allowable if the disruption is foreseeable and 
has not actually occurred.  For example, if a student creates 
harmful cyberbullying speech on an active website targeted at 
a school agent and recklessly distributes it only to students of 
that school, the school may not punish him if the speech 
causes no disruption at the school.  If the effects of the speech 
are not felt in school, the school cannot punish the speech.  If 
however, the same speech is heavily discussed at school and 
causes disruptions, then the speech may be punished.  In 
Kowalski, the website was shared with other students and 
 
 184. See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 572. 
 185. Justin P. Markey, Enough Tinkering with Students' Rights: The Need 
for an Enhanced First Amendment Standard to Protect Off-Campus Student 
Internet Speech, 36 CAP. U. L. REV. 129, 150 (2007). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
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Kowalski and several others said they were aware of the 
negative impact it would have on the target.188  The pictures 
and comments were added by other high school students and 
distributed without regard for the fact that the speech would 
find its way into the school environment.  The record shows 
that the victim of this speech felt its impact—refusing to 
attend her classes, causing a disruption in her schooling.189  
Therefore, the court in Kowalski would have been justified in 
punishing such speech even under the new reasoning. 
In Layshock and J.S., the websites were more passive 
than in Kowalski.  As mentioned before, however, Layshock’s 
speech more substantially disrupted school and was therefore 
punishable.  In J.S.’s case, the student was not very reckless 
about the speech—she protected it as much as she could and 
the principal was only able to view it after a student printed a 
copy and brought it into school.190  Classes were not disturbed 
and though the students spoke about it in class, the speech 
did not have much of an impact.191  Therefore, this speech 
would not be punishable under the new standard. While the 
courts may be clear on which standards to apply in certain 
situations, and how exactly to apply Tinker to certain cases, 
the problem does not end there. 
Regardless of the manner in which the Court chooses to 
redefine Tinker, the greatest need is for an unambiguous 
guideline schools . . . can apply to Internet speech.  Courts 
must strike a delicate balance between maintaining a 
productive and safe educational environment and allowing 
free speech and Internet dialogue to flourish.192 
D. Data Proposal 
The problem with ubiquitous computing is that not only 
is data simultaneously available to a great number of people, 
but this data is also logged away and archived for future 
access.  Unlike a malicious note passed in class or a satirical 
newsletter, this data is preserved for years and easily 
 
 188. See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 572–73. 
 189. See id. at 568. 
 190. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 921 
(3d Cir. 2011). 
 191. See id. 
 192. King, supra note 19, at 876 (footnote omitted). 
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accessible.  “A great deal of information about a user’s online 
actions can be collected quite easily.  Activities, which in the 
physical world traditionally have not led to the collection of 
potentially private information, can and do lead to such 
collection online.”193 
In the Tinker-Fraser-Kuhlmeier-Morse quartet, all the 
student speech was tangible in a way that cyberbullying is 
not.  There, speech consisted of black armbands, a school 
newspaper, a student speech at an assembly, and a banner.194 
In J.S., Layshock, and Kowalski, the cyberbullying was 
conducted on websites and passed around to others through 
the Internet.  Once published or produced, it was easy to 
replicate and difficult to completely eradicate.  This means 
that school districts, in looking to regulate cyberbullying, will 
have a great deal more data on their students than previously 
available and this may have an effect on what speech school 
districts are allowed to proscribe and punish. 
This data, which could have previously been a 
conversation among a group of frustrated students, a 
temporary venting of dissatisfaction or a quarrel, is now in 
the hands of the school district in a permanent format.  This 
problem, created by the rise of ubiquitous computing, is not 
accounted for in any of the Supreme Court’s decisions.195  The 
concurrence in J.S. hints at the data issue but does not 
address it.196  This increased access to data necessitates a 
stringent standard for regulating Internet speech.  The 
jurisdiction analyses proposed earlier would ensure that even 
if the school had access to data, the school district’s 
jurisdiction over such data would be limited and governed by 
the rule of law.197  This will ensure that the schools do not 
repress students’ constitutional rights but will let schools 
maintain a safe and bully-free environment for their 
students. 
 
 193. Boone, supra note 20, at 118. 
 194. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. 
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 
U.S. 675, 678 (1986); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 
503, 504 (1969). 
 195. See King, supra note 19, at 866. 
 196. J.S., 650 F.3d at 940 (Smith, J., concurring). 
 197. See supra Part III.B.1. 
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CONCLUSION 
The intersection of student speech, cyberbullying, and 
ubiquitous computing is creating novel situations for courts 
around the country.  Student speech cannot be chilled by 
excessive regulations and punishments.  School officials must 
guard student welfare.198  The circuit split examined in this 
Comment is a harbinger of additional rifts in cyberbulling 
jurisprudence.  In order to fairly assess cyberbullying, courts 
must determine whether a school has jurisdiction over the 
speech.199  Then courts must examine whether the speech 
caused a disruption in the school environment.200  Courts 
must also be mindful of the excessive data available to the 
government due to ubiquitous computing201 and be careful to 
guard against constitutional violations.202 
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